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A STRAIGHTFORWARD TALE.

BY

CLAY MACCAULEY.

Reprinted from the
Boston "Evening Transcript," July 5, 1899.

PUBLISHED BY THE
ANTI-IMPERIALIST LEAGUE.

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A STRAIGHTFORWARD TALE.

BY CLAY MACCAULEY.

"Mr. MacCauley is well known hereabouts and whatever he says commands the confidence that attaches to high character and sincere motives. . . . The facts which he presents regarding the situation in January last establish the contention . . . that the responsibility for the war rests on the Administration, and not on the opponents of the Paris treaty. It was the Administration which ungratefully cast off the allies it had courted, by whose aid it had captured Manila and its Spanish garrison. The United States might have continued the master of the Philippines, the respected and trusted protector of their people, stronger, we believe, in that quarter of the world than it can ever make itself by alienating the sympathy of those teeming populations, without provoking this dreadful war and its century-long train of rankling disappointment and hate." — *Boston "Herald" (formerly Administration and Imperialist newspaper), July 7, 1899.*

TOKYO, JAPAN, June 3.

Several letters concerning what has appeared over my name in the "Transcript's" columns about the relations of the Government of the United States with the Philippines have recently reached me. The political future of these islands has already been determined, probably beyond changing, and the end of the present conflict may have come before what I now write shall get to America. Yet I wish to answer these letters publicly. I may in this way clear up much that is obscure in the minds not only of some of my correspondents, but in the thoughts of many others of the "Transcript's" readers. Besides, it is desirable for the purpose of reference hereafter, I think, that there should be upon record a plain recital of

the experiences that induced me to speak as I did. The importance of the matter will excuse exceptional personal reference.

I am no "politician;" my work lies outside of "politics." Yet I am profoundly concerned over anything that may seriously affect the welfare of the United States. So far as I am at all a political partisan, I am a Republican, and have been a Republican since the beginnings of the party. I served as a soldier in the Civil War, and, for a time, after the battle of Chancellorsville, was confined in Libby Prison. During the late war with Spain I thoroughly sympathized with the humanitarian aim that seemed to guide it, and I welcomed the prospect of our gaining for their protection and guidance the peoples of the West Indies and the Philippines, assuming all along that these peoples desired our help.

My visit to Manila in January last was not made, as it has been said, "for the purpose of investigating the situation." It was undertaken because I was not well at the time, and believed that the voyage to the Philippines would be diverting and helpful. That the trip was the occasion of the opposition I have shown in the "Transcript" and elsewhere to the "annexation policy" of our country's Administration was not of my wishing; indeed, hardly anything has ever caused me more regret than the necessity I came under at the time to antagonize the course of action disclosed in the Philippines as authorized and commanded by President McKinley and his advisers. For a long time I could not believe that the disastrous drift of events there was going on known to the Washington authorities. I was inclined to lay the responsibility for the increasing perils upon the military commander directly in charge. I still think that General Otis, conscientious, faithful administrator and brave soldier that he is, was not as tactful as one should have been in his dealings with Aguinaldo and his followers. A commander temperamentally more like the President himself would probably have avoided much that hastened the grave alienations between Filipinos and Americans. Yet now it seems clear to me that General Otis did his work, in the main, in literal obedience to his superiors in America; that there it was assumed that the whole right and duty concerning the future disposition and control of the Philippine Islands lay in the wishes and will of the United States; that what the Filipinos themselves might wish need not be

taken into the account in formulating plans for their government. I think now that information of the increasing dangers that I found almost at their full when I arrived in Manila had been steadily communicated to the authorities at Washington, but that the authorities there upon principle regarded them as unworthy their attention, except as signs of a rebellion that should be forcibly dealt with should they lead to any resistance.

Apparently, from the downfall of Manila, the principle that guided the American Administration was that the only party to treat with in the settlement of the Philippine problem was Spain; that the Filipinos should be wholly passive to American dictation or suffer such consequences as one meted out to rebels. However, this question may meet us again. I shall for the present speak of the experiences I had at Manila that were decisive for me.

One of the first things that led me into serious conversation about the situation was a remark at dinner the day of my arrival by a friend resident in Manila. "You should have been here a few days ago and seen the sight. It took nine regiments to post one sentry." In the talk that followed I learned that at last an acute and dangerous crisis had been reached in the relations of the Filipinos and our forces. It appeared that while, up to the capture of Manila, the Filipino insurgents against Spain had been practically allies of the Americans, — in large part armed by us, associated with us in the siege of the Spanish army, and helpful to us in bringing about the surrender of Manila, — very soon after the surrender they were looked upon as an "obstacle" to our movements. I was told a long story of the repeated demands our officers had made upon the Filipinos, who had been occupying lines of attack upon the Spaniards drawn by them in coöperation with our forces, to "fall back," and to make place for our soldiers. They were, at first compliant, giving up their trenches and breastworks. During the summer and autumn the Filipinos yielded position after position in front of Manila to our regiments. Gradually a line of American soldiers was drawn around the captured city. The Filipinos were left outside our military circuit, an army once our "allies," but at last become only an embarrassing crowd, supplanted, repulsed, and, as soldiers, ignored. This changed relation of the two forces was not the result, so I was told, of the wishes of our own soldiers.

The American officers had but obeyed commands sent to them from Washington. One of my friends declared: "These people seem to have no existence of their own so far as Washington is concerned. No one there seems to care a bit for what they think or wish." Was it any wonder, then, that as the Filipinos were again and again ordered to "fall back;" as they saw the American enclosure of Manila completed; as they saw the American fleet and army increase week after week; and as they were made to understand more fully their exclusion from social and official intercourse with their former friends, they began to look upon the doings of the Americans as aggressive against themselves and as threatening an assumption of political sovereignty over them? Naturally their protests against the repeated demands made upon them to "fall back" began to arouse them to antagonism. They insisted upon their rights as our allies and as the people of the Philippines. They lost their idealization of their American "emancipators" with great unwillingness, but in the end they accepted the fact that they were dealing with would-be masters. They refused to withdraw farther. At a point near Paco, I think it was, they made their first attempt at resistance to our forces. They advanced somewhat their own lines. It was of this episode that my friend had spoken. Our demand had been insisted upon with a display of force. We had had our way. But we had also set gradually kindling fires of hate and revenge into full flame. The posting of that sentry cost us far more than it had gained. Thus it came about that the beginning of my visit to Manila was more like entrance into a besieged city than into a city that our armies had set free. But open hostilities were not yet. Persons without weapons had unchallenged ingress and egress through the two opposed lines.

It was during the time of this critical state of affairs that General Otis issued, in the President's name, the fateful proclamation of January 4, issued from the "Office of the Military Governor of the Philippine Islands." The day after I arrived in Manila the proclamation appeared. Immediately afterwards came Aguinaldo's counter-proclamation, protesting in most solemn and earnest terms against "this act, so little expected, of the sovereignty of America in these islands." So far as I heard persons discuss the matter, — and I heard many, — the proclamation of the President was regarded as neither happily put nor well-timed. But it at least made

the fact clear to every one that the American Government had determined to "administer affairs in the Philippine Islands," and that "the mission of the United States" was proclaimed as "one of beneficent assimilation." The further fact was made clear, also, that at last a "rupture of amicable relations between the Filipinos and the army of the United States" had really occurred, and that the Filipinos felt confident that they had "done everything possible to avoid a rupture, even to the extent of sacrificing uselessly many clear rights." The bitterness of the disappointment of these people was expressed in Aguinaldo's words: "I was convinced that the American forces must sympathize with the revolution which they had assisted to foment, and which saved them much bloodshed and hard work, and above all I had absolute confidence in the history and traditions of a nation which struggled for its independence, and for the abolition of slavery, and held itself up as the champion liberator of oppressed peoples under the safeguard of the good faith of a free people." These strong words, I know, have been ridiculed, but when I first read them under impressions made upon me by the judgment of men who believed Aguinaldo at least in earnest and sincere, I felt a profound pity for their writer and his people, and I longed to plead for him and his cause with the legislators at home who then held the liberties of the Filipinos under their unspoken wills.

Within two days after the President's proclamation and Aguinaldo's answers, I had the honor of a conversation with Gen. E. S. Otis, the military governor at Manila. I had become so much disturbed over the coming of the conflict which I then saw inevitable, unless some immediate preventive measure were devised, that possibly I attempted overmuch. However, General Otis received me courteously: I violate no confidence in repeating some of his words. He "hoped" that the crisis would "pass without trouble." I told him of my intention to write to some acquaintances, members of the United States Senate. I asked him whether there was anything he was willing to say that would aid me in my appeal. In answer, among other things, General Otis expressed regret that there was not a better knowledge of the situation among the Washington legislators than there seemed to be. And he impressed me deeply by his declaration: "I was ordered to this post from San Francisco. I did not believe in the annexation of these

islands when I came here, nor do I believe in their annexation now." General Otis has done his duty without wavering, all through the terrible months since the struggle began, yet I often now think of our Philippines commander—the careworn, anxious man I saw in January last—as doing his present duty without the inspiration that should make his burden light. Of course I speak thinking only of what General Otis believed at the time we had our talk.

I also had the privilege of conversation with Admiral Dewey. I violate no confidence in repeating some things he also said to me. I tell of these things that friends and the public generally may understand why I have been pleading so earnestly for the Filipinos and for the preservation of what I believe to be that which most honors our country among the world's nations. In talking with Admiral Dewey I went even so far as to say that I believed the people of the United States would support him were he to take some immediate initiative to prevent the threatening struggle. I shall not repeat his answer at length. But he spoke much of his concern over the turn affairs had taken, and added that he "was powerless to act." Yet at one point in his remarks he declared: "Rather than make a war of conquest of this people, I would up anchor and sail out of the harbor." He, like General Otis, has done his duty since then in giving his ships to aid the army in an attempt at restoring order to the islands, but I am sure that the duty has been sadly done, and that it was done only because it was duty.

Not only did I find the commanders of our army and navy opposed to the annexation of the Philippine Islands, but more outspoken in opposition were most of the officers high in command, both on the shore and in the fleet,—I mean those I had the pleasure of meeting. It is not necessary to tell of this fact at length. Moreover, our consul at Manila said decidedly that Aguinaldo and his immediate associates were not appreciated at home for their real worth. He, like our army and navy chiefs, did not believe in a conquest of the Filipinos; and he deprecated the unfortunate series of events that had led up to the hostile alienation that daily threatened an outbreak into war.

When I left Manila immediate danger had apparently been done away with by the appointment of commissions from both the opposed camps for the purpose of deliber-

ation. For days war had seemed to be only a question of each hour. But by means of the commissions time at least had been gained and a *modus vivendi* was possible. Each commander of the hostile forces had forbidden any aggressive act on the part of his soldiers. During the voyage to Hong Kong I still believed that, did the President only know the situation as it was, he could and would remove the whole trouble by a proclamation assuring the Filipinos of autonomy under an American protectorate. When I reached Hong Kong, January 15, the outlook at Manila was promising for peace, for a while at least. Since time had been gained I tried to reach the people and our President by the cable service of the New York "Herald," closing the despatch with the words, "Immediate action is imperative." I am not inclined to be an alarmist, but knowing what I did know, almost hopeless though the appeal seemed, I could not do other than make it. I could only do my part as every American citizen should, since all of us, in every station, large or small, share in our country's honor or disgrace.

Assuming as a privilege that an American citizen may express opinion freely on all matters affecting his country's welfare, and urged by the fearful perils confronting our nation at Manila, I wrote to President McKinley immediately upon my making Hong Kong. I had met him in Washington and I could refer him to well-known public men with whom I am acquainted. I shall here make parts of this letter public. "One of the chief misfortunes attending our occupation of Manila," I wrote, "has been the inability of our officials at home and there to announce to the Filipinos, definitely, as a thing established, an administrative policy. The Filipinos do not understand that the United States by act of Congress has not yet assumed the sovereignty of the islands. Moreover, most of their leaders are convinced that our assumption of this sovereignty naturally means assumption of it for our own use, and not as a trust to be held by the United States for them. In consequence . . . the alienation now so acute began, and as a result . . . our officers were obliged to decline official intercourse with the Filipinos. Soon social intercourse with them lessened, and finally it ceased. As a further result of this absence of a definite policy, the proclamation of January 4 in your name was misinterpreted by Aguinaldo, and thus widened instead of narrowing the chasm between our people and the Filipinos.

Aguinaldo answered General Otis as though it had been decreed by you that the Philippines had become subject to the United States, their people denied henceforth any form of autonomy, taken under control wholly without their consent and wholly without our having had any conference with them to that end. . . . But, whatever the cause, it is the lamentable fact that the Filipinos and the Americans are no longer friends. And they might have been good friends could our benevolent policy have been authoritatively announced months ago, and a sympathetic attitude towards them taken from the first by those in charge of the military administration of Manila."

I spoke then to the President of how formidable the Filipinos had become as armed enemies during the course of their alienation from us; in having "at first supplied them with arms as though they were our allies." I then described the dangers in the then present situation, and some scenes I had witnessed when I was within the insurgent lines and during the critical, excited days just before I had left Manila, asserting that only some "trifle would precipitate irremediable disaster."

In my appeal for some action that would avoid this calamity I wrote: "If it is among the possibilities Congress should so act that you can at once definitely announce the will of the American people concerning these islands. But, if it is the will of our people to assume actual sovereignty of the Philippines as an integral part of our body politic, I am sure that, unless some device is adopted by which the Philippine insurgents voluntarily accept the annexation of their country, we shall have to enter upon a war before which the calamities of our Seminole War in the Florida swamps would be insignificant. Annexation might be accomplished peaceably were we to do what we can to undo the effects of our attitude hitherto, that is, were we to assume sympathetic relations: to recognize Aguinaldo and his army as our allies during the past six months; to assure him a high command in the military or civil department of our Philippines' administration; to pay to the soldiers who served with him during the war; . . . to enlist a large body of these soldiers; . . . to conduct as far as possible the civil government . . . by means of native employees. The quicker way to peace and good feeling, however, is beyond question a decision by the American Congress that the Philippine people shall be autonomous under the protection of the United States.

"I assume much in making this expression of opinion, but I have studied this question with anxious interest. Besides, residence for some years in this part of the world has given me some insight into the character and needs of the peoples native here. I do not think the sudden incorporation of an Oriental, especially this Malay people into our body politic would help us. Our history does not justify us in making any race our subjects. . . . Moreover, the upper classes of the Philippines are intelligent and cultivated enough to make national self-government possible, or to endanger a government imposed upon them from another land. With a protectorate we can influence and help the Filipinos much. A possession on this seashore would give us a commanding interest in their foreign relations, and also in the management of our part of Asiatic commerce. In time closer relations might come naturally between our country and these islands. Then the result would satisfy and benefit us all."

I said much more in this letter to the President. I do not know that it ever reached him. Its receipt was, however, acknowledged by his secretary. But I was so much aroused by the crisis at Manila that I was compelled to make at least the effort to secure the President's attention.

As the world now knows, the threatened danger was not escaped. Within three weeks after the time of which I speak, the present terrible war began. As soon as I reached Japan I sent my first letter to the "Transcript," summarizing reasons why the Philippines should not be annexed to the United States and telling of my forebodings should there be no change in our evident policy towards them. At the outbreak of the hostilities I denounced the treatment of the Filipinos that had led up to the outbreak and told of where I thought the responsibility for our humiliation lay. To-day's letter will make clear why I took the positions shown in those letters. From what I have said here all will now clearly understand that my words were not written without urgent reason; that so far as events have happened I did not warn without ample cause; and that I have nowhere predicted imaginary evils. The Filipinos are now called "rebels" and are branded as felons. But they were never, in fact, either our fellow-citizens or our subjects. How, then, could they enter, in any true sense, into "rebellion" against the United States? I say this

not unmindful of the transfer of sovereignty over them made in the "Treaty of Paris" by Spain to our country. That was really an empty transfer so far as this people were involved. They had long refused to acknowledge Spain as their sovereign, and we had helped them make this revolt a success. They were their own masters in every real sense of the word when Manila fell, whatever the technicalities of international law may be. Further, men, really citizens of the United States, who now oppose this war for the conquest of the Philippines, are by many, so I see, denounced as "traitors" to the country. I return the charge, for I hold that "treason" for an American lies much nearer those who would bring about the subjugation of a people struggling for civil liberty than it does near those who pity them and who lament over the wrongs that arrayed them against our country. Of course I would give no aid or comfort to any one in arms against the United States, but I cannot do other now than oppose the misguided faction of my own people, that would complete the great wrong in progress in the Philippines. I must plead with my fellow-citizens to save our land from the dishonor that now threatens, if it does not already possess it.

What the larger obligations of the present Administration at Washington may be I do not know. These are "world-politics" now. According to international law the legalized parties to the political transfer of the Philippines were the United States, the conquerors of Spain, and Spain, the defeated state. The Filipinos, technically the subjects of Spain, possibly had no technical will that the governments negotiating about them were bound to respect. They were and had been for years in rebellion against Spain. We helped them in their rebellion. We accepted their help in our war upon Spain. Why our sudden change towards them? Was there any influence, not yet publicly acknowledged, that at the downfall of Manila compelled the Administration of the United States to push forward, so unreasoningly and relentlessly, its determination to ignore the Filipinos, their "allies," and to make of the Philippines an American "colony" or "possession," whether the Philippines' people so wished or not? Possibly, though this is the merest speculation, the American Administration is under some obligation, connected with certain rapidly maturing crises in "world-politics," and must do this act, let the peoples of the Philippines think what they will and

try to save themselves as they may. It is exceedingly difficult to guess well at any satisfactory explanation of this singular overthrow of the fundamental principles upon which the American democracy is based, but there may be the possibility that our seizure of this Asiatic archipelago is in part fulfilment of some pledge our authorities have made, that the solution of the Far Eastern question, when it comes, shall have the United States as a factor in its completion.

Were this the true explanation, some good men might persuade themselves to endure the present evils for the sake of some overwhelming gain. Even this explanation, however, would not remove the record of mistakes, misunderstanding, and injustice with which the course of events in the Philippines was marked during the diplomatic developments last year in the "world-politics" that made the arbitrary and heedless assumption of political sovereignty by the United States a necessity. If there is any truth in this speculation it will in time be known. At present the Far Eastern question is hastening to a definite discussion. The opposing nations are becoming more and more clearly known. It is now generally assumed in this part of the world that the United States is irrevocably involved in the portentous issues of the struggle that the great powers will at length not be able to avoid.

We have been brought, as a nation, to the coast of Asia. Over this fact I have heard some Europeans in Japan express undisguised pleasure. "You are in for it now and can't get away," was the form in which this satisfaction was expressed to me not long ago. Yes! we are "in for it;" but where are we "in for it" to uphold before the world now the standard of popular liberty, of a government of the people, for the people, and by the people; of a government basing its dominion upon the consent of the people it governs; of a government striving to realize the ideals that induced our forefathers to yield, with sacred devotion, property, person, and life? Where for these great purposes we are "in for it" at Manila it is just now difficult to see. As far as present evidence discloses facts, one is sorely tempted to lament of our republic, "How are the mighty fallen!"

To friends and to fellow-citizens I declare that I sought in my "Transcript" letters to tell only the truth concerning the situation in the Philippines, and nothing but the truth. I may not have told the whole truth, but

what I have put upon record has in large measure been justly a source of reproach to us, and should lead us to an undoing of the wrong, as far as possible; not into bravado or into condemnation or persecution of those who have sought to hold our beloved country true to its original faith and past deeds.

This plea becomes only the more forcible when, in the light of lately published official records, we follow the course of the interrelations of the Washington Administration and the leaders of the Filipinos. What do these records show but confusion and disaster resulting from the operation of cross-purposes held with simple persistence and devotion on each side from the very beginning? These pages disclose a pathetic self-delusion—so it proved to be—among the Filipinos; a precipitate sympathy and attempts to coöperate with the Filipinos among the American officials than in the far East, that the Washington authorities at once disavowed; an unswerving, uncompromising, and unconciliatory determination on the part of the Washington Administration to complete its own purpose of assuming the sovereignty of the Philippines; and finally the bitter disappointment of the Filipinos, engendering a hostile alienation that in the end became—who knows just how?—a terrible war.

The following extracts from the records tell the lamentable story: "On the twenty-fourth day of April Aguinaldo met the United States consul and others at Singapore and offered to begin a new insurrection in conjunction with the operations of the United States navy at Manila. This was telegraphed to Admiral Dewey." Admiral Dewey at once replied: "Tell Aguinaldo to come as soon as possible." Aguinaldo left Singapore on April 26. With seventeen other "revolutionary chiefs," early in May he was taken on the United States steamer "McCulloch" to Manila Bay. "They soon after landed at Cavite, and the admiral allowed them to take such guns, ammunitions, and stores as he did not require for himself." On May 24 Aguinaldo published at Cavite his first proclamation, beginning, "Filipinos: The great nation, North America, cradle of true liberty, and friendly on that account to the liberty of our people, oppressed and subjugated by the tyranny and despotism of those who have governed us, has come to manifest even here a protection which is decisive, as well as disinterested, toward us, considering us endowed with

sufficient civilization to govern by ourselves this our unhappy land." But on June 16 Secretary of State William L. Day, in a despatch to the consul-general at Singapore concerning Aguinaldo's coöperation with Admiral Dewey, wrote: "This Government has known the Philippine insurgents only as discontented and rebellious subjects of Spain, and is not acquainted with their purposes. The United States in entering upon the occupation of the islands, as the result of its military operations in that quarter, will do so in the exercise of the rights which the state of war confers, and will expect from the inhabitants, without regard to their former attitude toward the Spanish Government, that obedience which will be lawfully due from them." On July 4 General Anderson, then commanding, wrote to Aguinaldo: "I desire to have the most amicable relations with you and to have you and your people coöperate with us in military operations against the Spanish forces."

Within three weeks afterwards, July 22, General Anderson addressed Aguinaldo: "Commander General Philippine forces, I observe that your Excellency has announced yourself as dictator, and proclaimed martial law. I have no authority to recognize this assumption." "In order to prevent my countrymen from making common cause with the Spanish against the North Americans," answered Aguinaldo, "I came from Hong Kong." For this reason he had "proclaimed the dictatorship." This dictatorship was rapidly changing into a government of a "democratic and popular character." "My Government has not been acknowledged by any of the foreign powers, but we expected that the great North American nation, which struggled first for its independence, and afterwards for the abolition of slavery, and is now actually struggling for the independence of Cuba, would look upon it with greater benevolence than any other nation." August 1, writing to Consul Williams, Aguinaldo said: "You say all this and yet more will result from annexing ourselves to your people, and I also believe the same, since you are my friend and the friend of the Filipino, and have said it. But why should we say it? Will my people believe it? Is it intended, indeed, to carry out annexation against the wish of these people, distorting the legal sense of that word? If the Revolutionary Government is the genuine representative by right and deed of the Filipino people, as we have proved when necessary, why is it wished to oppress,

instead of gaining their confidence and friendship? . . . The Filipino people have learned to love liberty, order, justice, and civil life. . . . I and my leaders know how to admire and are ready to imitate the disinterestedness, the abnegation, and the patriotism of the grand men of America, among whom stands preëminent the immortal George Washington."

Soon after the downfall of Manila Aguinaldo's troops were ordered, "by threats of violence," he writes, "to retire from positions taken." General Merritt, then commanding, on August 20 specified an evacuation of the places at the time held by the "Philippine forces" within the suburbs of Manila. To this demand Aguinaldo yielded upon the acceptance of certain conditions by General Merritt. These conditions were declined by the American commander, and the evacuation insisted upon, with the explanation, "I am the more insistent in this particular, because recent instructions from my home Government contemplate this course." Aguinaldo submitted to General Merritt's order, still pleading for the acceptance of his conditions, that in case the United States should return the islands to Spain the Americans would restore to him the military positions he gave up to them.

"I comprehend," he wrote, August 27, "the inconvenience of a double occupation of the city of Manila and its environs, but you must also understand that without the wide blockade maintained by my forces you would have obtained possession of the ruins of the city, but never the surrender of the Spanish forces, who would have been able to retire to the interior towns. Do not make light of the aid given by us to secure the capitulation. Greatly though justice may suffer, and risking well-founded fears in regard to my city, I do not insist upon the retention of all the positions conquered by my forces within the environs, at the cost of much bloodshed, unspeakable fatigue, and much money. I promise to withdraw them to the following line. . . . I hope that this time a spirit of justice will be manifest which is worthy of a free and admirably constituted government such as that of the United States of America." From this time forward the alienation of our army and the Filipinos from one another steadily grew more grave. I have already told its story.

How the end will come who can predict? My own earnest prayer is that the people of the United States

may, as in years past, even yet realize that there is a higher law than that written in the books of legislators and bureaus of state. We observed this law when we emancipated the slave. We obeyed it again when we started to set Cuba free. We have been long violating it in the Philippines. The Treaty of Paris, international law, the proclamations of the American President, do not justify us in our disobedience to its commands. Our Government may relentlessly proclaim that its deeds are only done because "it is so nominated in the bond." But "the quality" of justice, like that "of mercy, is not strained." And as a people we may well bethink ourselves of a time when by the decrees of the Court that transcends all human power we may "have justice, more than we desire," and go smitten and degraded among the nations.

